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Introduction
Found footage is an existing motion picture that is used as an element of a new motion picture. Found 
footage filmmaking dates back to the origins of cinema. Filmmakers are practical and frugal, and happy 
to reuse materials when they can. But found footage filmmaking gradually developed into a rough genre 
of films that included documentaries, parodies, and collages. And found footage became a familiar ele-
ment of many other genres, which used found footage to illustrate a historical point or evoke an aesthetic 
response.
It can be difficult to determine whether found footage is protected by copyright, who owns the copyright, 
and whether particular uses of found footage infringe copyright, especially in the case of unpublished 
motion pictures. This article argues that copyright doctrine is unacceptably indeterminate and effectively 
restrictive in relation to the use of found footage.
The Purpose of Copyright
Intellectual property is a general term for laws that create exclusive rights to use certain intangible goods, 
like ideas and expressions. Copyright is a particular kind of intellectual property that gives authors certain 
exclusive rights in the works of authorship they create. Notably, copyright does not apply to the tangible 
copies of a work, but rather to the intangible work of authorship they embody.1
The Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution empowers Congress, “To promote 
the progress of science (…) by securing for limited times to authors (…) the exclusive right to their (...) 
writings.” Congress first used that power to enact the Copyright Act of 1790, which it has revised several 
times, most recently in the Copyright Act of 1979.
The purpose of copyright is to encourage people to create works of authorship. As Samuel Johnson ob-
served, “No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money” (quoted in Boswell, 1976:302). Without 
copyright, people could use works of authorship without paying for them. Copyright encourages the 
creation of works of authorship by enabling authors to charge for certain uses of the works they create. 
At least in theory, copyright is justified because the social cost of limiting the use of works of authorship 
is exceed by the social benefit of the additional works of authorship produced.2
The Subject Matter of Copyright
Under the 1976 Act, copyright protects original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression. In other words, copyright requires both originality and fixation.3 Found footage is typically pro-
tected by copyright, unless it has fallen into the public domain, because it is both original and fixed in a 
tangible medium.
Originality
The originality requirement provides that copyright can only protect original works of authorship, 
or works that are independently created by an author and display some minimal level of creativity.4 As a 
consequence, copyright cannot protect facts, which are discovered, not created by an author, and can 
protect compilations of facts only if they reflect some degree of creativity, or authorial judgment.5 In 
addition, the idea/expression dichotomy provides that copyright cannot protect ideas, but can protect 
particular expressions of an idea.6 The merger doctrine further provides that copyright cannot protect 
the expression of a fact or idea that can only be expressed in a limited number of ways (Clayton, 2005). 
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And the scènes à faire doctrine provides that copyright cannot 
protect generic plots and characters.7
The purpose of the originality requirement is to ensure that 
copyright does not conflict with the First Amendment, by 
unduly limiting speech, or infringe on the public domain, by 
protecting works that already exist.8 But the originality bar 
is very low.9 While copyright cannot protect a telephone di-
rectory, it can protect almost anything else.10 Motion pictures 
typically satisfy the originality requirement because they are 
created by a cinematographer, who exercises authorial judg-
ment about the subject of the motion picture.
Fixation
The fixation requirement provides that copyright can only 
protect works that are fixed in a tangible medium, or recorded 
in some way. The purpose of the fixation requirement is to 
limit the scope of copyright protection to recorded works and 
provide evidence of protected works (Lichtman, 2002:683 / 
Donat, 1997:1363, 1400). Motion pictures typically satisfy 
the fixation requirement because they are recorded on film 
or video.11
Categories of Works of Authorship
The 1976 Act protects eight categories of works of author-
ship, including motion pictures. But a particular work of au-
thorship may incorporate multiple categories of works of 
authorship. For example, motion pictures often incorporate 
a screenplay, set direction, a score, a soundtrack, and a series 
of related images. The screenplay may be protected as a liter-
ary or dramatic work, the set direction may be protected as a 
choreographic work, the score may be protected as a musical 
work, the soundtrack may be protected as a sound recording, 
and each image may be protected as a pictorial work. In oth-
er words, a particular found footage element may consist of 
many distinct copyrighted works.
Original Elements
Copyright can only protect the original elements of a work 
of authorship.12 As a consequence, every work of authorship 
is effectively a compilation of discrete elements, some of 
which may be original and protected by copyright, and some 
of which may not. For example, a motion picture may consist 
of images, dialogue, and music that are original and protected 
by copyright, as well as facts and ideas that are not. A motion 
picture may also incorporate pre-existing public domain ele-
ments, which cannot be protected by copyright.
Exclusive Rights
The Copyright Act gives authors certain exclusive rights in 
their works of authorship, which may include the exclusive 
right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, or display the 
work depending on the nature of the work and the context in 
which it is used. In other words, the Copyright Act enables 
copyright owners to prohibit the use of original elements of a 
work of authorship without permission. 
Ownership
Under the 1976 Act, obtaining a copyright in an original work 
of authorship is easy, because copyright exists as soon as the 
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. While reg-
istering a work with the Copyright Office provides valuable 
benefits, it is not necessary.
But determining copyright ownership can be more difficult. 
While copyright vests initially in the author or authors of the 
work, the statutory author of a work made for hire is the em-
ployer. Whether a work is a work made for hire is often difficult 
to determine, because it typically depends on a multi-factor 
balancing test.13 And in any case, the owner of the copyright 
in a work can license or transfer ownership of any element 
of the work. As a consequence, copyright ownership is often 
fragmented and unclear. Copyrighted works may be owned in 
whole or in part by many different people, especially if more 
than one person participated in the creation of the work, or 
elements of the work were licensed or transferred.
Duration
The Intellectual Property Clause authorizes Congress to grant 
copyrights for limited times. Initially, under the Copyright Act 
of 1790, the copyright term was 14 years, renewable by the 
author for an additional 14 years. But Congress gradually ex-
tended the term, and today it is typically the life of the author 
plus 70 years. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that the 
current copyright term lasts for a limited time, and has implied 
that anything short of forever is consistent with the limited 
times provision of the Intellectual Property Clause.14
Duration Under the 1976 Act
Unfortunately, the copyright term of a work of authorship can 
be remarkably difficult to determine. The copyright term in 
works created in 1978 or later is governed by the 1976 Act, 
as amended, and lasts for the life of the author or authors 
plus 70 years, or in the case of anonymous works and works 
made for hire, 95 years from publication or 120 years from 
creation, whichever expires first. So, in order to determine 
the copyright term, one must first determine whether it is a 
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work made for hire, and if not, one must identify all of the 
authors of the work and determine if and when they died. But 
in any case, works created in 1978 or later are protected by 
copyright, unless they are expressly dedicated to the public 
domain.15
Duration Under the 1909 Act
The copyright term in works created before 1978 is governed 
by the Copyright Act of 1909, as amended, and can be even 
more difficult to determine. Under the 1909 Act, the copy-
right term was 28 years from publication or registration, re-
newable for an additional 28 years, for a total potential term of 
56 years. However, the 1976 Act increased the renewal term 
to 47 years, and the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 
increased the renewal term to 67 years, for a total potential 
term of 95 years.
But the 1909 Act also required compliance with certain for-
malities. Specifically, obtaining a federal copyright required 
publication with notice, which consisted of the word “copy-
right” or symbol “©”, the year of first publication, and the 
name of the author. Unpublished works were protected by 
state common law copyright. And works published without 
notice fell irrevocably into the public domain.
As a consequence, the definition of publication is critically im-
portant to determining copyright protection under the 1909 
Act. While the 1909 Act did not define publication, courts 
eventually held that a limited or investive publication created 
copyright protection if accompanied by notice, and a general 
or divestive publication destroyed copyright protection unless 
accompanied by notice. Of course, whether a particular pub-
lication is investive or divestive depends on the context, and 
courts tend to err in favor of the author.
Determining the Copyright Term
The upshot is that works published before 1923 are in the pub-
lic domain, and works published in 1923 or later are protected 
by copyright, unless the author failed to provide notice or re-
new the copyright term. But the copyright status of unpub-
lished works is different. Typically, unpublished works creat-
ed by authors who died before 1946 are in the public domain, 
and unpublished works created by authors who died in 1946 
or later are protected by copyright. However, unpublished 
works made for hire and unpublished anonymous works are 
in the public domain only if they were created before 1896.16
Infringement
If copyright owners believe that someone has infringed one 
of their exclusive rights in a work of authorship, they can file 
a copyright infringement action. In order to make out a prima 
facie copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff must prove: 
1) ownership of a valid copyright; 2) actual copying of one or 
more original elements of the copyrighted work, and 3) sub-
stantial similarity caused by copying original elements.
To prove ownership, the plaintiff must show that the allegedly 
infringed work includes one or more original elements that 
are protected by copyright, and must also show actual own-
ership of the copyright in those elements. In other words, 
plaintiffs can file an infringement action only if they actually 
own a work that is protected by copyright. Using a public do-
main element of a work cannot infringe copyright, because 
no copyright exists, and does not even require attribution.17 
To prove actual copying, the plaintiff must provide either di-
rect or circumstantial evidence of copying. Direct evidence 
is unusual, because infringers rarely admit to copying, so 
plaintiffs tend to provide circumstantial evidence by show-
ing access and probative similarity. In other words, a plaintiff 
can prove copying by showing that the defendant had access 
to the plaintiff’s work, and that similarities between the two 
works support an inference of copying.18
And to prove substantial similarity, the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant’s work is substantially similar to the plain-
tiff’s work, and that the works are similar because the defen-
dant copied protected elements of the plaintiff’s work. In oth-
er words, you can copy facts and ideas with impunity, because 
copyright can only protect the original elements of a work.
At least in theory. In practice, many courts have held that sub-
stantial similarity is a question of fact for the jury, and that 
substantial similarity only requires copying the total concept 
and feel of a work, which obviously may incorporate ideas and 
generic elements.19 In other words, while copyright technical-
ly does not protect facts and ideas, it can effectively enable 
copyright owners to prohibit the use of those unprotectable 
elements of their works, by enabling them to prove an in-
fringement claim without showing that the defendant copied 
any specific original elements of their work.20
Limitations on the Exclusive Rights
of Copyright Owners
There are many statutory limitations on the exclusive rights 
of copyright owners, most of which apply to specific catego-
ries of works or kinds of uses. For example, the first sale doc-
trine allows the purchaser of a copy of a copyrighted work to 
resell their copy without infringing the copyright owner’s dis-
tribution right, and the mechanical license allows musicians to 
create sound recordings or covers of musical works for a fixed 
fee, without the permission of the copyright owner. But the 
most important limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright 
owners is arguably the fair use doctrine, which provides that 
certain prima facie infringing uses of a copyrighted work are 
non-infringing fair uses.
The Fair Use Doctrine
Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement. The purpose 
of the fair use doctrine is to ensure that the scope of copyright 
protection is consistent with the public interest and the First 
Amendment.21 Prior to the 1976 Act, fair use was a common 
law doctrine.22 While the 1976 Act codified the fair use doc-
trine for the first time, Congress’s intention was to restate the 
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or en-
large it in any way.23
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Under the fair use doctrine, certain uses of copyrighted works 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search are non-infringing fair uses. Courts must consider four 
factors in determining whether a particular use is a fair use:
1. The purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.
2. The nature of the copyrighted work.
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. 
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.
In practice, the first fair use factor is the most important, 
and courts primarily ask whether or not a particular use is 
transformative.24 The purpose of the transformative test is to 
ensure that copyright owners cannot prevent productive uses 
of works of authorship:
The use must be productive and must employ the quoted mat-
ter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the 
original. A quotation of copyrighted material that merely re-
packages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test; 
in Justice Story’s words, it would merely supersede the objects 
of the original. If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds 
value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw mate-
rial, transformed in the creation of new information, new aes-
thetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type 
of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the 
enrichment of society (Leval, 1990:1105, 1111).25
Economists would say that the fair use doctrine reduces trans-
action costs on authorship by allowing authors to make pro-
ductive uses of original elements of existing works of author-
ship without permission. For example, quoting a sentence 
from an existing literary work is typically a fair use, because 
requiring authors to obtain permission before quoting would 
be unnecessarily burdensome. Likewise, using an original el-
ement of an existing work in order to criticize it is typically 
a fair use, because many copyright owners would refuse per-
mission to critical uses.
But the application of the fair use doctrine can be unpredict-
able.26 For example, it can depend on the nature of the work 
copied. Courts have typically held that quoting a sentence 
from a literary work is a fair use, but that quoting a musical 
phrase from a sound recording is not.27 And it can also de-
pend on the nature of the use. While the fair use analysis is 
theoretically objective, juries and courts both tend to consider 
whether the alleged infringer acted in good faith.28 
Finally, while the statutory fair use doctrine explicitly pro-
vides that the fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar 
a finding of fair use, the Supreme Court has recognized a dis-
tinct statutory right of first publication, which affects the bal-
ance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair use. As a result, 
the unauthorized use of an unpublished work is typically not 
a fair use, or at least, is less likely to be a fair use than the 
unauthorized use of a published work.29
Copyright & Found Footage
Found footage is an element of an existing motion picture that 
is used as an element of a new motion picture.30 Filmmakers 
use found footage in many different ways, but it is especially 
common in documentaries and collage films, which may con-
sist entirely of found footage.31
Unsurprisingly, the use of found footage may present an as-
sortment of copyright issues. Of course, if found footage is in 
the public domain, anyone can use it with impunity. For ex-
ample, Bruce Conner’s film Crossroads (1976) consists entire-
ly of found footage of the July 25, 1946 Operation Crossroads 
Baker underwater nuclear test at Bikini Atoll (Wees, 2010). 
The found footage was created by the United States govern-
ment, so it is in the public domain, and Conner could use it 
without permission.32 
But if found footage is not in the public domain, using it 
without permission is typically a prima facie infringing use, 
so the user must either obtain permission to use the mate-




to determine whether an element of a motion picture is pro-
tected by copyright. And if an element of a motion picture is 
protected by copyright, it may be difficult to determine the 
owner.
Ironically, using an element of a commercial motion picture 
tends to present the fewest copyright issues, because the own-
ership of a commercial motion picture can usually be deter-
mined. Commercial films are typically published by distribu-
tion to the public.34 And the copyright in a commercial film 
usually belongs to the publisher. So the copyright term of a 
commercial motion picture is often relatively easy to deter-
mine. As a result, an author who wants to use an element of 
a copyrighted commercial film can either request permission, 
or make a fair use claim.
Of course, filmmakers may or may not receive permission to 
use particular found footage, the terms of use may or may not 
be reasonable, and fair use claims are inherently unpredict-
able, at least on the margins. But at the very least, found foot-
age filmmakers can usually determine the copyright status 
and ownership of a commercial motion picture.
For example, Rodney Ascher’s film Room 237 (2012) con-
sists in substantial part of found footage copied from Stanley 
Kubrick’s film The Shining (1980). The owner of the copyright 
in the found footage is relatively easy to determine, because 
Warner Brothers, Inc. registered copyrights in the screenplay, 
images, and soundtrack of The Shining, and acknowledged 
Stephen King’s novel The Shining (1977) as a previously exist-
ing copyrighted work. And the found footage was published, 
because copies of The Shining were both sold and rented to 
the public. As a consequence, Ascher could either negotiate a 
license with Warner or make a fair use claim to use the found 
footage in order to comment on The Shining.
Similarly, Jason Osder’s film Let the Fire Burn (2013) consists 
entirely of found footage, primarily television news broad-
casts. The owner of the copyright in the found footage is rela-
tively easy to determine, because the copyright in a television 
news recording typically belongs to the station that produced 
the recording. And the found footage was probably published, 
because copies of television news recordings are typically sold 
or rented to the public, often via stock footage companies. As 
a consequence, Osder could either purchase a license from 
a stock footage company or make a fair use claim to use the 
found footage in order to comment on the events depicted in 
the television news recordings.
However, the use of non-commercial found footage can pres-
ent some of the most vexing problems in copyright law. The 
Copyright Act assumes that works are created for commer-
cial gain. And courts largely follow suit. But the Copyright Act 
effectively provides that all original works are protected by 
copyright, unless they are affirmatively placed in the public 
domain. Every letter, fax, and email is protected by copyright, 
as well as every home movie, home video, and vine.
Using an element of a non-commercial motion picture of-
ten presents difficult copyright issues, because it can be dif-
ficult to determine the copyright status and ownership of a 
non-commercial film. In addition, it is often unclear whether 
a non-commercial film was ever published, so it can be diffi-
cult to determine the copyright term.
Let the Fire Burn
Jason Osder (2013)
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For example, Rich Bott and Jim Fetterley of Animal Charm 
create video collages using found footage from discarded vid-
eotapes.35 The owner of the copyright in the motion pictures 
they use is often unclear or effectively impossible to deter-
mine. But the motion pictures are typically published, because 
they were sold to the public, often by their copyright owner. 
As a consequence, Animal Charm effectively cannot license 
the motion pictures they use, but can make fair use claims.
But amateur motion pictures and home movies present the 
most difficult copyright issues. For one thing, their authorship 
is often difficult or impossible to determine. Amateur motion 
pictures and home movies are often acquired from third par-
ties like film laboratories, collectors, antique stores, or flea 
markets. They may or may not be accompanied by informa-
tion indicating their provenance, like names or addresses. The 
people named may be dead or impossible to find. And in any 
case, third parties may have created or participated in the cre-
ation of the films. As a consequence, it is often difficult or im-
possible to determine who owns the copyright in an amateur 
motion picture or home movie. And if you cannot identify 
the owner of the copyright in a film, it is impossible to ask for 
permission to use it.
Copyright scholars refer to works that lack an identifiable 
owner as orphan works. They present a problem because copy-
right law assumes that people who want to use a work can 
negotiate with the owner of the copyright in that work. But 
under the 1909 Act, copyright protects many works that no 
longer have substantial commercial value, and under the 1979 
Act, copyright protects everything, whether or not it ever had 
any commercial value. So many works with no commercial 
value are effectively in limbo.
In addition, the overwhelming majority of amateur motion 
pictures and home movies are unpublished, because they 
were never distributed to the public. Amateur motion pic-
tures are typically shown privately, and rarely distributed to 
the public.36 Home movies are typically private, and exist as 
unique copies.37 As a consequence, the copyright term of an 
amateur film or home movie is either the life of the artist plus 
70 years or 125 years, depending on the author of the film.
For example, Our Nixon (Penny Lane, 2013) consists in large 
part of home movies filmed by Nixon aides H.R. Haldeman, 
John Ehrlichman, and Dwight Chapin between 1969 and 
1973.38 But it is largely impossible to determine who creat-
ed which home movies. Anyone could have been holding the 
camera. However, the Nixon White House home movies were 
nationalized by the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974. As a consequence, they 
can be used by anyone, for any purpose, without permission.
But the Nixon White House home movies are the exception 
that prove the rule. Most amateur films and home movies are 
anonymous and unpublished. As a consequence, they are typ-
ically protected by copyright, at least in theory. For example, 
Alan Berliner’s film The Family Album (1986) consists entirely 
of found home movies, acquired from many different sources. 
In other words, the found footage used in the film is anony-
mous and unpublished, and at least potentially infringing.
As a consequence, using found footage is almost always a po-
tentially infringing or transgressive use of a copyrighted work. 
Using an original element of a published commercial motion 
picture is typically a prima facie infringing use, but is often 
protected by fair use, if the new work is transformative. But 
using an original element of an unpublished, non-commercial 
work is typically not a fair use, at least under the prevailing 
interpretation of the fair use doctrine, because it infringes the 
right of first publication.39 Effectively, even transformative 
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Objections to the Fair Use Doctrine
Moreover, as Amy Adler has observed, the concept of trans-
formativeness essential to the fair use doctrine is inconsistent 
with many of the ways in which authors, especially artists, ac-
tually use elements of existing works (Adler). For example, 
artists like Andy Warhol, Sherrie Levine, Richard Prince, and 
Jeff Koons routinely use original elements of existing works 
of authorship without transforming them in any of the ways 
contemplated by the fair use doctrine. While their uses create 
new meanings, they do so by changing the context in which 
those works are presented, rather than changing the works 
themselves.   
Likewise, while many filmmakers use original elements of ex-
isting motion pictures in transformative ways that are protect-
ed by fair use, others do not. For example, many filmmakers 
have created so-called perfect films, or unedited found foot-
age presented as a work of authorship.40 Such perfect films are 
non-transformative uses of unpublished works that would al-
most certainly be infringing.
In addition, as Andrew Gilden has observed, the open-ended 
nature of the transformativeness inquiry tends to disadvantage 
marginalized authors (Gilden, forthcoming publication in 
2016). The transformativeness analysis increasingly relies on 
a raw material metaphor that favors artists seen by courts as 
cooking or recontextualizing the material they incorporate into 
their work, rather than using it in its raw form. But this raw/
cooked dichotomy subtly encourages courts to privilege cer-
tain kinds of uses over others. While courts are increasingly 
willing to find that rich and fabulous appropriation artists have 
transformed the works that they copy by cooking the raw ma-
terials of culture, they are less willing to pardon lesser-known 
artists. In other words, courts unconsciously respond to so-
cial cues. While blue-chip artists like Prince and Koons have 
mounted successful fair use defenses based on recontextual-
ization, socially marginalized authors are typically less suc-
cessful (Gilden, forthcoming publication in 2016).
Of course, this could cut either way for found footage film-
makers, depending on their circumstances. It could benefit 
well-established filmmakers, who can produce evidence of 
the cultural significance of their works, at the expense of 
marginalized filmmakers, who cannot. But to the extent that 
found footage filmmaking is historically a marginal art form, 
the transformativeness inquiry and its raw/cooked metaphor 
are likely to disadvantage many found footage filmmakers, es-
pecially those who create perfect films and other found footage 
forms that rely on minimal modification of the found footage.
Conclusion
The purpose of copyright is to encourage the creation of 
works of authorship. The fair use doctrine is intended to com-
plement copyright by facilitating productive uses of the orig-
inal elements of works of authorship. But copyright and fair 
use are both inconsistent with many artistic practices relating 
to found footage. Copyright and fair use assume that authors 
typically copy elements of commercial works, and are intend-
ed to distinguish between competing and non-competing uses 
of the original elements of a work. But found footage film-
makers often use elements of unpublished motion pictures, 
and often use elements of motion pictures in ways that are 
inconsistent with the current interpretation of the transfor-
mativeness requirement of the fair use doctrine. Accordingly, 
found footage filmmaking practices identify certain problems 
with copyright doctrine and suggest the need for certain re-
visions. Specifically, courts should define transformativeness 
more broadly, and should abandon the distinction between 
published and unpublished works, in order to enable the pro-
ductive use of historically significant motion pictures.
* While many aspects of the US copyright laws have been standard-
ized through international copyright agreements, copyright laws 
differ depending on country.
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1. But see the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 
U.S.C. § 106A (giving the author of a work of visual art 
certain rights of attribution and integrity that inhere 
in the tangible copies of a work).
2. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of 
our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 
author’s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by 
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for 
the general public good.”). Of course, there are 
alternative theories of copyright, some of which are 
non-consequentialist. See generally Menell (consult 
bibliography).
3. “Originality is a constitutional requirement.” Feist 
v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 
(1991). Fixation is a statutory requirement, and 
may or may not be a constitutional requirement. See 
(Carpenter & Hetcher, 2014:2221, 2236) noting that 
writings arguably implies fixation.
4. Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
345, 359 (1991).
5. Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
345, 347-48, 359 (1991).
6. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 547, 556 (1985) (explaining that 
“no author may copyright facts or ideas” because 
“copyright is limited to those aspects of the work—
termed expression—that display the stamp of the 
author’s originality.”) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).
7. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 
119 (2d Cir. 1930).
8. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
9. Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 345 (1991) (“To be sure, the requisite level of 
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will 
suffice.”).
10. Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 363 (1991) (“As a constitutional matter, 
copyright protects only those constituent elements 
of a work that possess more than a de minimis 
quantum of creativity. Rural’s white pages, limited 
to basic subscriber information and arranged 
alphabetically, fall short of the mark.”).
11. Copyright Law Revision (House Report No. 
94–1476): “Under the bill it makes no difference 
what the form, manner, or medium of fixation 
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sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic 
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written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, 
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machine or device now known or later developed.” 
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Revision (House Report No. 94–1476)
12. Feist v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 
340, 348 (1991) (“The mere fact that a work is 
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the work may be protected. Originality remains the 
sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright 
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a work that are original to the author.”).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a work made for 
hire) and Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). See generally, (Vacca, 
2014:42). 
14. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003).
15. The Copyright Act explicitly provides that works 
created by the federal government are in the public 
domain. 17 U.S. Code § 105. Authors may also 
choose to dedicate their works to the public domain.
16. For a useful chart outlining the copyright term, 
see Peter B. Hirtle, ‘Copyright Term and the Public 
Domain in the United States,’ at: < http://copyright.
cornell.edu/resources/publicdomain.cfm >
17. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (holding that 
neither copyright nor trademark can prevent the 
unattributed use of a public domain work).
18. Plaintiffs typically prove access by showing 
that the defendant had a direct connection to the 
allegedly infringed work, or that the allegedly 
infringed work was famous. Greg Dolin has referred 
to these respectively as the Kevin Bacon (how 
many degrees of separation?) and Leonard Cohen 
(Everybody Knows the work in question) theories of 
access.
19. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
20. See, e.g., Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 
LACV1306004JAKAGRX, 2015 WL 4479500, at *17 
(C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (affirming a jury verdict of 
copyright infringement based on the total look and 
feel of two songs, without specifically identifying 
any copied original elements).
21. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9. F.Cas. 342 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (Story, J.) (adopting an early version 
of the fair use doctrine, based on English copyright 
law). See (Reese, 2006:259).
23. 1976´s Copyright Law Revision (House Report 
No. 94–1476) 
24. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(1994) (“The central purpose of this investigation 
is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new 
work merely supersede[s] the objects of the original 
creation, (…) or instead adds something new, with 
a further purpose or different character, altering the 
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it 
asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the 
new work is transformative.”).
25. But see Amy Adler (consult bibliography), who 
argues that the transformative test has failed art and 
should be abandoned.
26. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig (consult bibliography) 
claiming that fair use “simply means the right to 
hire a lawyer.” But see Aufderheide & Jaszi (consult 
bibliography) arguing that fair use has become more 
predictable and useful.
27. Compare Faulkner Literary Rights v. Sony 
Pictures Classics, 953 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Miss. 
2013) (holding that a quotation from William 
Faulkner’s novel Requiem for a Nun used in Woody 
Allen’s film Midnight in Paris was a transformative 
fair use) with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
use of an altered 2 second sample from Funkadelic’s 
song Get Off Your Ass and Jam in N.W.A.’s song 100 
Miles and Runnin’ was not a fair use).
28. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569 (1994) with Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
29. See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 
F. 3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the use of 
unpublished photos was not a fair use).
30. The term found footage is also used to denote a 
film genre that presents a fiction film as if it were 
a documentary, typically representing that the film 
was made by one of the actors.
31. For example, Emile de Antonio’s Point of Order 
(1964) is a documentary film that consists entirely 
of found footage and Joseph Cornell’s Rose Hobart 
(1936) is a collage film that consists entirely of 
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32. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (providing that “[c]opyright 
protection under this title is not available for any 
work of the United States Government”).
33. Certain de minimis uses of elements of 
copyrighted works are not infringing uses, 
typically because the element used is insufficiently 
substantial to qualify for copyright protection. 
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F. 3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 
2004) (holding that the unauthorized use of a three-
note, six-second element of a musical work was de 
minimis).
34. United States Copyright Office, Circular 
45: Copyright Registration for Motion Pictures, 
Including Video Recordings, at: < http://copyright.
gov/circs/circ45.pdf > (“Publication of a motion 
picture takes place when one or more copies 
are distributed to the public by sale, rental, 
lease, or lending or when an offering is made to 
distribute copies to a group (wholesalers, retailers, 
broadcasters, motion picture distributors, and the 
like for purposes of further distribution or public 
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35. See Animal Charm website, at: < http://www.
animalcharm.com/index.html >
36. But see The Film-Makers’ Cooperative, and 
Canyon Cinema, which enabled amateur filmmakers 
to distribute films to the public, beginning in the 
mid-1960s.
37. Home movies filmed on 16mm, 8mm, and Super-
8mm film were rarely copied, at least in part because 
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originals. Home videos were also rarely copied, 
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of home movies and home videos were created only 
in order to facilitate presentation in a new medium. 
For example, films were transferred to video, and 
analog videos were transferred to a digital format.
38. See: < http://ournixon.com/about-the-film/ >
39. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (finding a right of 
first publication).
40. The term perfect film was coined by Ken Jacobs, 
who observed: “I wish more stuff was available 
in its raw state, as primary source material for 
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just that way, the evidence uncontaminated by 
compulsive proprietary misapplied artistry, editing, 
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(1999).
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